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Abstract. Real market institutions, stock and commodity exchanges for exam-
ple, do not occur in isolation. The same stocks and commodities may be listed on
multiple exchanges, and traders who want to deal in those goods have a choice
of markets in which to trade. While there has been extensive res arch into agent-
based trading in individual markets, there is little work onthis kind of multiple
market scenario. Our work seeks to address this imbalance, examining how stan-
dard economic measures, like allocative efficiency, are affected by the presence of
multiple markets for the same good. We find that while dividing traders between
several small markets typically leads to lower efficiency than grouping them into
one large market, the movement of traders between markets, and price incentives
for changing markets, can reduce this loss of efficiency.
1 Introduction
An auction, according to [4], is a market mechanism in which messages from t aders
include some price information — this information may be an offer to buy at a given
price, in the case of abid, or an offer to sell at a given price, in the case of anask— and
which gives priority to higher bids and lower asks. The rulesof an auction determine, on
the basis of the offers that have been made, the allocation ofgoods and money between
traders. When well designed [8], auctions achieve desired economic outcomes like high
allocative efficiencywhilst being easy to implement. Auctions have been widely used in
solving real-world resource allocation problems [9], and istructuring stock or futures
exchanges [4].
There are many different kinds of auction. One of the most widely used auction
is thedouble auction(DA), in which both buyers and sellers are allowed to exchange
offers simultaneously. Since double auctions allow dynamic pricing on both the supply
side and the demand side of the marketplace, their study is ofgreat importance, both
to theoretical economists, and those seeking to implement real-world market places.
Thecontinuous double auction(CDA) is aDA in which traders make deals continuously
throughout the auction. TheCDA is one of the most common exchange institutions, and
is in fact the primary institution for trading of equities, commodities and derivatives
in markets such as the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and Chicago Mercantile
Exchange. Another common kind of double auction market is the clearing-house(CH)
in which the market clears at a pre-specified time, allowing all tr ders to place offers
before any matches are found. TheCH is used, for example, to set stock prices at the
beginning of trading on some exchange markets.
Our focus in this paper is on the behavior of multiple auctions for the same good.
This interest is motivated by the fact that such situations occur in the real world. Com-
pany stock is frequently listed on several stock exchanges.Indian companies, for exam-
ple, can be listed on both the National Stock Exchange (NSE) and the Bombay Stock
Exchange (BSE) [18]. US companies may be listed on both theNYSE, NASDAQ and,
in the case of larger firms, non-US markets like the London Stock Exchange (LSE).
The interactions between such exchanges can be complex, as when theNSEopened and
proceeded to claim much of the trade volume from the establishedBSE [18], or when
unfulfilled orders on theCME overflowed onto theNYSE during the global stock mar-
ket crash of 1987 [10]. This kind of interaction between markets has not been widely
studied, least of all using automated traders.
2 Background
Double auctions have been extensively studied using both human traders and comput-
erized agents. Starting in 1955, Smith carried out numerousexperiments investigating
the behavior of such markets, documented in papers such as [19, 20]. The experiments
in [19], for example, involved human traders and showed thateven with limited infor-
mation available, and only a few participants, theCDA can achieve very high efficiency,
comes close to the theoretical equilibrium, and responds rapidly to changing market
conditions. This result was in contrast to classical theory, which suggested that high
efficiency would require a very large number of traders, and led some to suggest that
the form of the market itself was sufficient to ensure efficieny. In other words, Smith’s
results led to the suggestion that double auction markets arbound to lead to efficiency
irrespective of the way that traders behave. Gode and Sunder[6] t sted this hypothesis,
introducing two automated trading strategies which they dubbed “zero-intelligence”.
The two strategies Gode and Sunder studied werez o intelligence without constraint
(ZI-U) andzero intelligence with constraint(ZI-C). ZI-U traders make offers at random,
while ZI-C traders make offers at random, but are constrained so as to enure that traders
do not make a loss (it is easy to see thatZI-U traders can make a loss, and so can eas-
ily lead to low efficiency markets). In the experiments reported in [6], theZI-C traders
gained high efficiency and came close enough to the performance of human traders that
Gode and Sunder claimed that trader intelligence is not necessary for the market to
achieve high efficiency and that only the constraint on not making a loss is important.
This position was attacked by Cliff [2], who showed that if supply and demand
are asymmetric, the average transaction prices ofZI-C traders can very significantly
from the theoretical equilibrium. They then introduced thezero intelligence plus(ZIP)
trader, which uses a simple machine learning technique to decide what offers to make
based on previous offers and the trades that have taken place. ZIP traders outperformZI-
C traders, achieving both higher efficiency and approaching equilibrium more closely
across a wider range of market conditions (though [2][page 60] suggests conditions un-
der whichZIP will fail to attain equilibrium), prompting Cliff to suggest thatZIP traders
embodied the minimal intelligence required. A range of other rading algorithms have
been proposed — including those that took part in the Santa Fedouble auction tourna-
ment [16], the reinforcement learningRoth-Erevapproach (RE) [15] and the expected-
profit maximizingGjerstad-Dickhautapproach (GD) [5] — and the performance of
these algorithms evaluated under various market conditions.
This work on trading strategies is only one facet of the research on auctions. Gode
and Sunder’s results suggest that the structure of the auction mechanisms plays an im-
portant role in determining the outcome of an auction, and this is further borne out by
the work of [23] (which also points out that results hinge on both auction design and
the mix of trading strategies used). For example, if an auction isstrategy-proof, traders
need not bother to conceal their private values and in such autions complex trading
agents are not required.
As mentioned above, there has been little work on multiple market scenarios. We
have presented some initial results on the dynamics of auctions hat compete for traders
[12] and the design of such auctions was the focus of theTAC Market Design compe-
tition [13]. This paper is a further contribution in the samedirection, considering the
impact of multiple markets on the efficiency of trading.
3 Experimental Setup
3.1 Software
To experiment with multiple markets, we used the Java-basedserver platform (JCAT)
[7]. JCAT provides the ability to run multiple double auction marketspopulated by
traders that use a variety of trading strategies, and was used to support the 2007TAC
Market Design competition [1]. Auctions inJCAT follow the usual pattern for work on
automated trading agents, running for a number of tradingays, with each day being
broken up into a series ofrounds. A round is an opportunity for agents to make offers
(shouts) to buy or sell, and we distinguish different days because at the beginning of a
day, agents have their inventories replenished. As a result, every buyer can buy goods
every day, and every seller can sell every day. Days are not iden ical because agents are
aware of what happened on the previous day. Thus it is possible for traders to learn,
over the course of several days, the optimal way to trade.
We run a number ofJCAT markets simultaneously, allowing traders to move be-
tween markets at the end of a day. In practice this means that traders need a decision
mechanism that picks which market to trade in. Using this approach, agents are not only
learning how best to make offers, which they will have to do anew for each market, but
they are also learning which market is best for them. Of course, which market is best
will depend partly on the properties of different markets, but also on which other agents
are in those markets.
3.2 Traders
Traders in our experiments have two tasks. One is to decide how to make offers. The
mechanism they use to do this is theirtrading strategy. The other task is to choose
market to make offers in. The mechanism for doing this is their market selection strat-
egy. We studied markets in which all the traders used the same trading strategy, and
considered three such strategies:
– Gode and Sunder’s zero intelligence with constraint (ZI-C) strategy [6];
– Cliff’s zero intelligence plus (ZIP) strategy [2]; and
– Roth and Erev’s reinforcement learning strategy (RE) [15].
The reason for picking the first of these is that given by [11, 22] that sinceZI-C is not
making bids with any intelligence, any effects we see have tobe a result of market
structure, rather than a consequence of the trading strategy, and hence will be robust
across markets inhabited by different kinds of trader. The reason for pickingZIP andRE
is that given by [14]. The first of these strategies is typicalof the behavior of automated
traders, while the second is a good model of human bidding behavior. Using both will
give us results indicative of markets with both human and software traders.
The market selection strategy is based on a simple model for reinforcement learning.
Traders treat the choice of market as ann-armed bandit problem that they solve using
an ǫ-greedy exploration policy [21]. Using this approach the behavior of the agents is
controlled by two parametersǫ andα. A trader chooses what it estimates to be the best
market, in terms of daily trading profit, with probability1 − ǫ, and randomly chooses
one of the remaining markets otherwise.ǫ may remain constant or be variable over
time, depending upon the value of the parameterα [21]. If α is 1, ǫ remains constant,
while if α takes any value in(0, 1), ǫ will reduce over time. For these experiments, we
setα to 1, andǫ to 0.1. The results from or previous work on the interactions betwen
multiple markets [12] suggest that market selection behavior is rather insensitive to the
parameters we choose here.
JCAT is typically set up to use the market selection strategy to decide which mar-
ket each trader should participate in at the start of each day. Since this facility can be
disabled, however, we could experiment with two different ki ds of trader movement:
– Mobile: traders choose a market at the start of each day (thismay be the same
market in which the traders participated the previous day).
– Stationary: traders always remain in the same market.
Each trader is permitted to buy or sell at most five units of goods per day, and each trader
has a private value for these goods, a value which is drawn from a uniform distribution
between $50 and $150. A given trader is assumed to have the same private value for all
goods that it trades throughout the entire experiment.
3.3 Markets
While JCAT allows us to charge traders in a variety of ways, we used just four kinds of
charge in the work reported here:
– Shout fees, charges made by the market for each shout made by atrader.
– Information fees, charges made by the market for information about shouts made
by other traders in the market.
– Transaction fees, charges made by the market for each transaction executed by a
trader.
– Profit fees, charges made by the market on the profit made by traders on any trans-
actions that they execute.
We set shout, information and transaction fees to constant,low, figures ($0.1, $2 and
$0.1 respectively). These are values typical of those adopted byentrants in the 2007
TAC Market Design Competition, and, as [13] discusses, are sufficient to provide a
small negative reinforcement that encourages traders to leave markets in which they are
not managing to make trades.
We used three different mechanisms for setting the profit fees:
– Fixed: a constant proportion, typically 10%, 20%, 30%, 40% and 50% of the sur-
plus on a transaction, is taken as a fee.
– Zero intelligence (ZI): a version of theZIP strategy for traders [3] adapted for mar-
kets and introduced by [12]. AZI market adjusts its charges to be just lower than
that of the market that is the most profitable. If it is the mostprofitable market, it
raises its charges slightly.
– Free: no profit fees are charged.
In all of our experiments the markets are populated by 100 traders, evenly split between
buyers and sellers.
3.4 Experiments
Our main aim in this work was to answer the questions “what is the economic effect
of running a number of parallel markets?”, and “what is the eff ct of different charg-
ing regimes?”, so our basic comparisons are between the situation in which all traders
transact in a single market, and the situation in which traders are split across a num-
ber of markets for different charging mechanisms. We were also interested in the effect
of traders moving between markets — the results published byNiu et al. [12] tell us
that traders move between markets due to the charges imposedby markets, but it does
not say anything about the effect of that movement on the overall performance of the
markets in economic terms.
These considerations led us to compare the performance of thsingle market, and
the multiple markets in different scenarios. We consideredsix ifferent scenarios — one
scenario for each combination of charging mechanism (fixed,ZI and free) and traders
that are either mobile or stationary. For a given trading strategy, we considered all six
of these scenarios for both theCH and theCDA.
Thus we ran a total of 36 experiments, six scenarios for the two different kinds
of market and the three different trading strategies. For each experiment we obtained
results for both trades split across five markets and all the traders concentrated in one
market. Each of these 36 experiments was run for400 trading days, with each day being
split into 50 0.5-second-long rounds. We repeated each experiment50 times.
3.5 Measurements
The effectiveness of a market can be measured in a number of different ways.Allocative
efficiency, Ea, is used to measure how good a market is at generating global profits. The
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for all agents who trade, wherepi is the price of a trade made by agenti andvi is the




|vi − p0| (2)
for all buyers whose private value is no less than the equilibrium price,p0, and all sellers
whose private value is no greater thanp0. The equilibrium price is the price at which
the number of goods sold equals the number of good bought and can be computed from





Ea tells us how close a market is to theoretical equilibrium in terms of profits made.
However, it says nothing about how close a market is to trading at the equilibrium
price. For the latter we use thecoefficient of convergenceα, introduced by Smith [19].










For the multiple market experiments, we measure the efficiencies and convergence of
each individual market, but also what we call theglobal values which assess the mea-

















wherevji is the private value of agenti in marketj, p
j
i is the price paid by agenti in
marketj, andp0 is the equilibrium price of the global market. The global value ofα is
computed similarly.
4 Results
Figure 1, which summarizes the results of the experiment that places mobileZIP traders
in CH markets that adjust their profit charges using theZI mechanism, show the typical


































Changes of Number of Traders
(a) Number of traders changing market each
day
































Changes of Equilibrium Price
(b) Change in equilibrium price each day
Fig. 1: How individual markets change over time. MobileZIP traders inCH markets that
useZI to set charges on trader profits.
way that markets change over time. All the other experimentshave very similar results,
and the results parallel those we reported in [12].
Figure 1 (a) shows the number of traders leaving each of the five markets at the end
of each day. The lines plotting these numbers for each of the markets are superimposed
over each other since the performances of the markets in thisregard are indistinguish-
able. Over the first 50 days, the amount of “churn” falls steadily and eventually the
movement between markets stabilizes and settles to a constant value. However, because
the market selection strategy always keeps exploring, on average each market still has
two traders leave each day. (On average, the same number of traders also enter).
This movement of traders necessarily has a effect on the trading that takes place
in each of the markets. Whereas we would expect a single market to rapidly approach
equilibrium after just a few days, in the multiple market case, this does not happen. Fig-
ure 1(b), which plots the dailychangein equilibrium price in each market, is testimony
to the way that that the markets don’t have a settled equilibrium. Every market has a
non-zero daily change, even at the end of the 400 period. However, we do see a certain
level of stability emerge — by 300 days or so, while there are still changes from day
to day, the trend is for the average change in equilibrium price to settle towards a limit.
This limit ranges from around $10 in M0 to around $30 in M4
In case these results suggest that there is no overall pattern, consider Figure 2. This
plots the global values of efficiency and the coefficient of convergence for the same ex-
periment as in Figure 1. As described above, global efficiency is omputed by summing
actual trader profits and then dividing by the theoretical profit that would be madeif
all the traders were in the same market. It thus gives us a picture of our set of markets
taken as a whole, and shows that, despite the churn, the overall picture has settled down
after around 200 days.





















































(b) Global coefficient of convergence
Fig. 2: How individual markets change over time. MobileZIP traders inCH markets
that useZI to set charges on trader profits. The plots show average valueand standard
deviation.
Having sketched the overall behavior of the markets in our experiments, the main
results of this paper are given in Tables 1–3. These give, foreach of the experiments
outlined above, the efficiencies of markets M0 to M4, the globa efficiency, and the
efficiency of a single market containing all the traders. This latter differs from the global
measure in that the actual trader profits are obtained in the single market rather than in
the individual markets (while the theoretical profit is the same in both cases). The values
of the efficiency given is averaged over the last 100 days of each xperiment as well as
across the 50 runs of each experiment.
The first point to make is that, just as one would expect from usual theoretical anal-
ysis, say [17], the efficiency of the single market of 100 traders is greater than the global
efficiency (though there is an exception). Not only is this inagreement with the theory,
but it is not surprising. The theoretical profit is the same inboth cases, so for the global
efficiency to be higher, the individual markets would have todo a better job of matching
traders than the single market. Clearly the churn will make any optimal matching hard
to sustain even if it occurs in the first place.
Some other interesting points emerge. First, looking just at the global values, we
see that across all three trading strategies, markets with mobile traders are more effi-
cient than markets with stationary traders. It therefore seems to be the case that trader
mobility leads to higher efficiency. Traders that move to maxi ize their own expected
profit, which is the effect of the market selection strategy we use, end up improving the
performance of the markets as a whole. Second, again across all three trading strategies,
the best performing (in terms of efficiency) individual markets, with mobile traders, that
make charges on profits outperform any of the corresponding individual markets that




























































































































































































































Fig. 3: Typical final day supply and demand curves for the fixedchargingCDA markets
(a)–(e) with stationary traders and (f)–(j) with mobile traders.
do not charge3. Thus, not only does it seem that mobility leads to higher effici ncy, but
it also seems that charging does.
Third, the effect of charging is strong enough that withZIP andRE traders (the ones
that might be considered more rational because they pick offers that aim to maximize
their profits) these best performing individual markets do so well that they lift the global
performance of the charging markets with mobile traders above that of the markets that
don’t charge. (This despite the fact that the higher charging individual markets have
considerably lower efficiencies than the markets that do notcharge). Thus, not only do
individual markets benefit from the charges, but it seems that overallthe markets benefit
— they certainly manage to extract more total profits that way.
5 Discussion
An explanation for the effects that we see is provided by Figure 3. This compares
one typical set of supply and demand curves for the final trading ay of five paral-
lel CDA markets, all of which charge. The difference between the twosets is that in
one the traders are allowed to move while in the other the are st tionary. Whereas in
the markets with stationary traders the numbers of intra-margin l traders (to the left
of the intersection between supply and demand curves) and extra-marginal traders (to
the right of the intersection) are fairly well balanced, as one would expect of a ran-
dom allocation of private values, this is not the case in the markets with the mobile
traders. In these latter markets the traders have sorted themselves so that market M0
has no extra-marginal buyers, market M2 has no extra-marginl traders at all, M4 has
no intra-marginal traders, and M3 has virtually no intra-marginal traders. Since, as [24]
points out, the reason thatCDA markets lose efficiency is because of extra-marginal
traders “stealing” transactions from intra-marginal traders (who for a given transaction
3 In other words, M0 under fixed andZI charging has efficiency than any of the markets which
are free.




M0 M1 M2 M3 M4 global
CDA
Mobile
Fixed 87.14 80.67 71.47 65.90 64.99 85.45 ⋆88.86
11.96 20.07 27.04 29.85 30.99 3.49 2.05
ZI 87.15 80.88 78.36 66.25 60.49 85.54 ⋆87.58
12.17 20.65 22.89 30.09 32.26 3.31 2.35
Free 78.80 76.37 78.27 79.36 78.24 85.66 ⋆88.92
22.46 25.48 22.41 22.22 23.31 3.03 2.01
Stationary
Fixed 83.10 82.71 83.59 82.91 83.86 77.02 ⋆88.86
11.11 9.19 9.19 8.25 8.40 5.80 2.05
ZI 82.38 84.70 81.65 80.51 81.51 77.18 ⋆87.58
10.63 10.42 12.08 13.49 14.91 6.05 2.35
Free 81.20 81.83 81.65 80.58 81.20 77.25 ⋆88.92
11.05 10.86 12.48 11.29 12.55 5.37 2.01
CH
Mobile
Fixed 84.99 75.05 69.12 57.41 55.83 81.16 ⋆81.99
20.01 24.85 30.87 30.87 31.30 3.20 2.99
ZI 87.41 79.55 69.29 60.43 57.81⋆83.52 81.30
7.17 16.02 25.13 29.86 30.89 2.94 2.63
Free 74.58 76.38 71.83 72.94 77.90 83.72 ⋆83.89
24.73 22.10 24.96 25.31 21.37 3.14 2.76
Stationary
Fixed 86.40 86.26 85.56 86.7487.67 77.80 ⋆81.99
8.47 8.85 7.63 8.72 8.72 5.11 2.99
ZI 79.78 81.0881.72 78.62 77.69 76.09 ⋆81.30
9.50 9.95 7.99 12.24 13.73 5.13 2.63
Free 79.35 80.77 82.46 80.32 81.29 76.86 ⋆83.89
11.82 10.48 9.11 10.12 11.86 4.66 2.76
Italic numbers are standard deviations,bold numbers indicate the better of the global and single
market values,bold italic identifies the largest value on each line, and⋆ denotes that where these
comparisons are significant at the 95% level. The charges on profit rise linearly from M0 (10%)
to M4 (50%). In the case of theZI markets, these are the figures from which charges start.
Note that in a single market it makes no sense for traders to move since there is no market to
move to or from. As a result, figures for mobile and stationarytraders are the same.




M0 M1 M2 M3 M4 global
CDA
Mobile
Fixed 97.06 96.24 96.11 94.60 93.24 94.53 ⋆97.93
5.59 7.54 7.76 11.84 14.38 2.59 1.27
ZI 96.79 96.91 96.63 94.43 93.49 94.51 ⋆98.55
7.15 5.34 5.74 12.68 14.30 2.62 1.04
Free 96.04 96.39 96.17 95.88 95.63 94.22 ⋆99.49
8.19 6.80 7.34 8.26 9.18 2.63 0.47
Stationary
Fixed 97.47 97.86 97.4698.05 96.98 91.14 ⋆97.93
3.03 3.23 3.34 4.96 4.16 4.16 1.27
ZI 97.66 97.85 97.80 97.97 97.87 90.37 ⋆98.55
2.96 2.72 2.76 3.25 2.65 4.15 1.04
Free 97.27 97.59 97.60 97.55 97.54 89.62 ⋆99.49
4.11 3.75 3.49 4.57 4.16 5.10 0.47
CH
Mobile
Fixed 98.85 98.53 97.52 96.38 95.09 96.62 ⋆99.74
4.74 8.25 11.25 13.75 13.75 2.10 0.52
ZI 98.56 97.89 96.88 96.65 94.17 96.74 ⋆99.68
4.71 7.50 10.07 10.86 16.45 2.34 0.49
Free 97.96 97.79 98.41 98.24 98.17 96.91 ⋆99.75
6.77 7.62 4.60 5.02 5.98 2.06 0.49
Stationary
Fixed 99.04 99.01 99.36 99.22 99.01 90.54 ⋆99.74
3.45 2.06 3.40 3.96 4.98 4.98 0.52
ZI 99.35 99.16 99.21 99.32 99.03 92.50 ⋆99.68
1.79 2.82 2.67 2.04 4.11 4.19 0.49
Free 99.29 98.56 99.06 99.06 99.19 91.34 ⋆99.75
2.55 5.66 3.35 2.97 2.91 4.76 0.49
Italic numbers are standard deviations,bold numbers indicate the better of the global and single
market values,bold italic identifies the largest value on each line, and⋆ denotes that where these
comparisons are significant at the 95% level. The charges on profit rise linearly from M0 (10%)
to M4 (50%). In the case of theZI markets, these are the figures from which charges start.
Note that in a single market it makes no sense for traders to move since there is no market to
move to or from. As a result, figures for mobile and stationarytraders are the same.




M0 M1 M2 M3 M4 global
CDA
Mobile
Fixed 89.89 88.62 79.54 68.81 68.57 85.79 ⋆89.14
9.29 29.06 39.19 40.06 3.07 3.07 1.68
ZI 89.94 89.20 79.69 70.43 66.90 86.55 ⋆87.39
2.93 8.41 29.40 38.49 41.10 3.21 2.46
Free 86.97 87.29 85.85 85.37 84.93 85.59 ⋆89.37
14.74 12.08 17.89 18.11 18.58 3.00 1.69
Stationary
Fixed 88.47 89.79 88.17 88.26 89.40 82.07 ⋆89.14
4.85 4.80 5.33 4.70 4.92 4.92 1.68
ZI 87.75 87.62 87.12 86.9788.09 81.42 ⋆87.39
5.53 7.25 6.74 5.66 5.49 5.49 2.46
Free 88.6489.53 87.93 88.74 87.72 81.15 ⋆89.37
5.94 5.18 5.65 4.98 5.59 5.26 1.69
CH
Mobile
Fixed 99.01 97.73 94.52 89.83 87.90 95.90 ⋆99.33
5.30 15.90 24.81 27.67 27.67 2.94 0.86
ZI 98.86 97.71 95.74 92.48 87.57 95.83 ⋆99.42
2.30 6.76 12.84 20.95 28.84 3.28 0.78
Free 97.18 97.87 97.41 97.23 97.27 95.51 ⋆99.20
6.28 8.34 8.84 8.54 8.54 2.90 0.92
Stationary
Fixed 98.46 98.51 98.50 98.56 98.89 91.99 ⋆99.33
2.79 2.73 2.62 2.41 4.60 4.60 0.86
ZI 98.65 98.66 98.58 98.81 98.84 88.13 ⋆99.42
2.49 2.36 2.57 2.48 2.13 6.42 0.78
Free 98.44 98.66 98.73 98.65 98.59 89.48 ⋆99.20
2.58 2.30 2.52 2.86 5.59 5.59 0.92
Italic numbers are standard deviations,bold numbers indicate the better of the global and single
market values,bold italic identifies the largest value on each line, and⋆ denotes that where these
comparisons are significant at the 95% level. The charges on profit rise linearly from M0 (10%)
to M4 (50%). In the case of theZI markets, these are the figures from which charges start.
Note that in a single market it makes no sense for traders to move since there is no market to
move to or from. As a result, figures for mobile and stationarytraders are the same.
will, by definition, generate a larger profit), the segregation that we observe will lead
to increased efficiency. In addition, as we observed in [13],charges have the effect of
prodding traders that aren’t making profits — and so are not adding to the efficiency
of a given market — to try different markets, allowing markets to rid themselves of
unproductive traders.
In CH markets, of course, extra-marginal traders cannot “steal”tr des away from
intra-marginal traders (at least not if they make rational offers). However, the movement
of traders can still increase profits by allowing a trader that is extra-marginal in one
market to become intra-marginal in another. Again, this behavior is encouraged by the
combination of the market selection strategy and the charges imposed by the markets.
Finally, we should note that the efficiencies of the individual markets and the global
efficiencies are rather low compared with those often reportd for the trading strategies
we use (in contrast the single market values are much the sameas one would expect
given the random allocation of private values to traders). We attribute this to churn.
When a trader moves from one market to another, any learning it underwent in the old
market is no use any more, and may even be detrimental. Similarly, the influx of new
traders into a market can invalidate the learning previously ndertaken by traders that
have not moved.
6 Conclusions
The main conclusion of this paper is that while dividing traders into multiple markets
leads to a loss of efficiency, this loss is reduced when traders are allowed to move
between markets in search of greater profits, and this movement is ncouraged by the
imposition of fees on the traders. This result holds becausethe movement of traders
between markets serves to segment those markets. Since the movement is profit-driven,
traders migrate towards markets that allow them to make goodtrades, and overall this
increases the total profits of the set of markets, increasingthe global efficiency. This
effect is sharpened by the application of fees since these tend to reduce profits and
further discourage agents from remaining in markets that are unprofitable for them.
Our current work extends the investigation reported here. Ware examining: the
robustness of our results against traders who use differentalgorithms to do market se-
lection; the effect of different levels of charging on the changes in efficiency that we
observe; and the influence of network effects, such as restrictions on the mobility of
traders, on the effects that we observe here.
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